Introduction
Government debt defaults are a recurring feature of public finance. These defaults have typically involved low-income and emerging-market economies, although recent cases include advancedeconomy sovereigns. As a result, there is a prolific literature analyzing various aspects of sovereign debt crises -notably the political and economic factors that drive defaults, their domestic economic and financial effects, and the global impact of episodes where multiple defaults are involved.
Even so, comprehensive data on sovereign defaults have been hard to come by. This reflects a number of factors. An important reason is that there is no single internationally recognized definition of what constitutes a sovereign default. As a result, standards used by government borrowers and their creditors to report defaults, if they report at all, differ, and information on the various types of defaulted debt must be mined from different sources. The Bank's Credit Rating Assessment Group (CRAG) database helps fill these gaps through the compilation of a comprehensive country-by-country and global data set of government debt in default that applies a common standard for determining when defaults occur.
This report is organized as follows. We start by proposing a definition of when a sovereign default has occurred. We next describe the main components of the CRAG database. We highlight the sources we use to compile the data and, where applicable, the methods employed to develop estimates. We also score the reliability of default data for each country. We then provide a commentary looking at historical trends in the default data, which can deepen our understanding of the impact on global financial stability of individual and multiple cases of sovereign defaults. A final section offers some conclusions. An appendix provides additional information on the sources used for the country-by-country and aggregate data.
Determining Sovereign Defaults
Like other types of debt, sovereign debt -the term commonly used to denote debt issued by national governments and certain fiscally autonomous territories -is a contractual obligation. A failure to meet these contractual obligations to pay interest or principal on the due date on sovereign debt provides one clear-cut example of a default. Another example is a failure by a government to honour debt it has lawfully guaranteed where there are clear provisions for the guarantor to make timely payment. That said, sovereign defaults are often not so explicit.
Government responses to financial distress can take many forms. In some cases, it can be inferred that, even in the absence of an actual interruption of debt service, a default has effectively occurred because actions by the sovereign result in economic losses by creditors, which can vary widely.
Consistent with much of the literature on sovereign defaults , and the practice of credit-rating agencies , 1 we consider that a default has occurred when debt service is not paid on the due date (or within a specified grace period), payments are not made within the time frame specified under a guarantee, or, absent an outright payment default, in any of the following circumstances where creditors incur material economic losses on the sovereign debt they hold:
• agreements between governments and creditors that reduce interest rates and/or extend maturities on outstanding debt;
• government exchange offers to creditors where existing debt is swapped for new debt on less-economic terms;
• government purchases of debt at substantial discounts to par;
• government redenomination of foreign currency debt into new local currency obligations on less-economic terms;
• swaps of sovereign debt for equity (usually relating to privatization programs) on lesseconomic terms; or,
• conversion of central bank notes into new currency of less-than-equivalent face value. Within the country and global totals, debt in one or more of the following creditor subcategories is included:
Features of the CRAG Sovereign Default Database
• International Monetary Fund (IMF);
• International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank);
• Paris Club;
• other official creditors;
• private creditors;
• foreign currency bank loans;
• foreign currency bonds; and,
• local currency debt.
In addition to the country-by-country components, in most cases the database contains the following aggregate data for the period starting in 1975 to 2014:
2 The CRAG database is distinct from and complements the data sets measuring the nominal value of sovereign debt restructuring agreements and creditor losses involving private creditors and Paris Club official creditors published by and , respectively.
• total debt in default (in nominal U.S. dollars);
• total debt in default by creditor type (in nominal U.S. dollars);
• number of sovereign governments;
• number of sovereign governments in default;
• outstanding Paris Club debt (in nominal U.S. dollars);
• global general government or public debt (in nominal U.S. dollars); and,
• global gross domestic product (in nominal U.S. dollars).
Data Sources and Data Estimation
To construct the CRAG database, we utilized data previously published by the Asian It is important to highlight that some of our country data are, in fact, estimated. As and others have noted, documenting which sovereigns have defaulted, the time frame of such defaults, and the amounts of debt affected can be challenging. This is particularly true for local currency defaults, which often are not acknowledged as such by the governments involved and which have been little studied in the literature. Even in the better-documented cases where defaults are resolved through a formal debt-restructuring process, different sources can, at times, provide contradictory information.
Consequently, while we have relied on sources we consider to be reliable, our database of sovereign defaults may not be exhaustive. Some defaults may have been overlooked. Estimates of the U.S.-dollar amounts of debt involved, in particular, may be subject to revision. Additional information on defaults, as it becomes available, will be incorporated in future database updates.
Any errors in the identification and estimation processes employed are, of course, the sole responsibility of the authors. Foreign currency bank loans. This category refers to foreign currency-denominated bilateral and syndicated loans to governments by commercial banks. For bank loan defaults resolved through a formal restructuring process and involving interest arrears, the amounts of debt restructured (or subject to debt buybacks) reported by and others generally serve as our starting point. Utilizing available information on the original terms of the loans, which usually include a variable rate of interest (typically LIBOR) plus a spread, we compute cumulative interest arrears for the years prior to the resolution of the default and add them to the loan amounts outstanding for each year that loans are determined to be in default. In cases where bank debt restructurings are not preceded by a payment default, we include the debt amount in the year(s) in which the workout process occurred. Where bank loan defaults remain unresolved, we develop our annual estimates of default amounts from information on the original loans reported by Exotix (2011) and others; these data could ultimately be revised based on updated information as and when the debt is formally restructured. When defaulted obligations are denominated in another currency, we use applicable end-of-period exchange rates to convert amounts into U.S. dollars. Where a default has occurred but we have insufficient information to estimate the amount of debt involved, we show asterisks rather than values for the applicable year, and we record the default in the annual global total number of defaults.
Foreign currency bonds.
This category refers to foreign currency-denominated bonds and other marketable securities issued by governments. Where bond interest is due but unpaid, we estimate cumulative interest arrears for the years from the start to the end of the bond default based on reported bond coupons. We add these amounts to the outstanding face value of the bond for each year of default. In cases where no payment default has occurred but old bonds are subject to an exchange proposed by the government for new bonds, which results in creditor losses, we view the face value of eligible bonds to be in default from the point when an exchange is announced to when it is completed. We view a resumption of normal debt service on existing bonds or, more typically, the completion of a bond exchange as the point at which a bond default has been resolved. This is the case in a bond exchange even when some bondholders -known as holdout creditors -do not tender their bonds. 5 Where defaulted bonds are denominated in another currency, we used applicable end-of-period exchange rates to convert amounts into U.S. dollars.
Local currency debt.
This category refers to debt issued by a government in its own currency.
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As already noted, local currency debt defaults are only sporadically reported as such. As a result, our estimates, which are gathered from national sources and/or derived from budgetary interest and principal arrears reported in IMF country reports, are provisional. The majority of these defaults tend to be resolved quickly. 
Assessing Data Reliability
Using a similar approach to that followed by , we score the relative data quality of our country-by-country estimates of debt in default. On a scale of 1 (denoting high reliability) to 4 (denoting least reliability), we determine a summary score based on the average of the subscores assigned to four variables:
1. years in which default occurred;
2. types of debt in default;
3. characteristics of debt restructured (e.g., interest rate, original maturity); and, 4. consistency of information from different sources.
Of course, there must be an element of judgment in an exercise that measures data reliability in relative terms. The following example, for Jamaica, helps illustrate the process we follow. We highlight Jamaica because, under our definition, it has been in default on six debt types -IMF lending, other official creditors, private creditors, foreign currency bank loans, foreign currency bonds and local currency debt -at various times over the 1975-2014 period.
For Jamaica, since we have a fair degree of confidence that we have identified all cases of default and the years in which they occurred, we assign a score of 3 to this subcategory. We are relatively confident that we have identified all the types of debt involved in each case, so we score this subcategory at 2. We score our knowledge about the characteristics of the debt restructured at 3, because we are less confident about our estimates of the value of debt restructured in the 1970s and 1980s than for debt restructured more recently. We find that the information from the different sources we consulted is fairly consistent, but since arrears owed to official creditors are taken from the World Bank's World DataBank and are subject to revision, we score this factor at 3. Finally, averaging the results of the subcategories leads to an overall score of 3.
Sovereign Defaults in Historical Perspective
CRAG's new database and future updates will be helpful to researchers analyzing the economic and financial effects of sovereign defaults from 1975 onwards. The data set is particularly useful since it facilitates comparisons of the scale of individual and multiple default events with earlier episodes. As such, it can contribute to our understanding of ongoing risks to global financial stability. The commentary that follows highlights some of the most noteworthy trends.
From the historical record, we know that for nearly 200 years the story of sovereign defaults has centred mainly, though not exclusively, on foreign currency bonds and other marketable securities. 7 Cross-border bond financing for governments emerged in the 1820s, when newly independent states in Latin America and other regions, as well as some longer-established sovereigns, began issuing bonds denominated in foreign currency in European financial centres.
Defaults soon followed on a substantial scale and persisted well into the 20th century. Defaults on local currency-denominated debt also occurred but were less frequent.
After the Second World War, owing to pervasive national controls on capital movements, crossborder bond issuance by governments fell to low levels, as did defaults, and both remained low over nearly four decades. For a relatively brief period, in the 1970s and 1980s, foreign currencydenominated loans by banks eclipsed bonds in importance. Many developing and East European countries defaulted on bank loans in the 1980s and 1990s, leading to creditor losses. The banks' subsequent exit from this business laid the groundwork for low-and middle-income sovereigns to regain access to cross-border bond markets in the 1990s, which continues to this day.
The period since the 1990s is also noteworthy because of growing cross-border investments in the local currency-denominated market debt of emerging-market sovereigns. This development helped trigger a number of defaults involving such sovereigns as Russia, Argentina and Jamaica, often accompanied by restructurings of their foreign currency bonds. These latter defaults, though also increasing, nonetheless remain well below their pre-World War Two historical peaks.
Chart 1 provides a snapshot of trends in defaults on foreign currency bonds and bank loans from 1820 to 2010. 8 Because of limited historical bond data for much of this period, we calculate unweighted default rates, i.e., governments in default as a per cent of all governments. 9 For bonds, three peak default periods stand out -between the 1830s and 1850s, when default rates exceeded 25 per cent; in the 1870s, when default rates averaged 18 per cent; and in the 1930s, when they reached 21 per cent. Of note, too, is the sharp decline in bond defaults after the Second World War that persisted through the 1980s. The resolution of many prewar bond defaults was the main driver of the fall in the default rate. At the same time, the fragmentation of the early post-Second World War cross-border financial markets limited bond market access to only the most creditworthy borrowers, and so defaults on new issues were low.
Prior to the Second World War, sovereign defaults on official loans played only an intermittent role. Then, after 1945, lending to governments by the IMF and other newly established MLIs quickly gained prominence. These institutions, together with national export credit and development agencies, were launched in part to fill perceived gaps in public finance left by shrinkage in the cross-border bond markets. They increasingly targeted loans to developing country governments on concessional terms, and initially defaults on official loans were low.
By the 1980s, however, the sharp rise in sovereign defaults on foreign currency bank loans shown in Chart 1 was accompanied by growing defaults on loans from official creditors. Even arrears on IMF loans surfaced, although their size was minor compared with other creditors. As seen in Chart 2, public debt in default exceeded US$400 billion by 1990, with debt owed to GDP. However, due to reliability issues relating to pre-Second World War national income data in many countries, we have not replicated this approach here. Chart 3 scales the nominal value of debt in default by nominal global public debt and GDP to measure the relative importance of sovereign defaults. At the start of the 1980s, defaults had minimal impact globally. However, by the middle of the decade, fiscal stresses affecting lowand middle-income countries were significant -the sovereign debt that defaulted, was restructured and in many cases ultimately written down peaked at about 6 per cent of global public debt. The increase was milder in terms of global GDP, rising from near zero to just over 2 per cent.
Chart 3 also shows that the global footprint left by these debt workouts has since faded, despite
Argentina's big default in 2001 and, most recently, the restructurings of sovereign bonds and official loans in the euro area. Nonetheless, the frequency of such events may be on the rise again and could be more closely correlated with rising public debt burdens than at any time since the 1930s. With many governments grappling with fiscal challenges, these are trends worth watching alongside other potential risks to global financial stability.
Conclusion
The Bank of Canada's new CRAG database will be useful to researchers analyzing the economic and financial effects of individual sovereign defaults and, importantly, the impact on global 
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